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Abstract:  
 
The Maltese market is and has always been, dominated by Family Businesses (FB) to the 
extent that such entities are vital to the resilience of our economy.    
 
There tends to be the presupposition that as soon as FBs convert to a public listing, they 
start implementing rational governance mechanisms, contrasting with the "non-rational 
behaviour" which is normally associated with the dynamics of running an FB.   
 
With this study the authors focus on equity-listed Maltese companies on the Malta Stock 
Exchange (MSE) and aim to build an understanding on the current situation of such entities’ 
GC structures to possibly conclude on whether Maltese LFBs are taking the initiative to 
apply appropriate governance measures which meet their strategic needs, even though there 
are no obligatory regulations or recommendations on the matter.  
 
Moreover, they will shed light on (i) the characteristics of LFBs; (ii) the family governance 
structures (‘FGS’) in such companies including the role of family institutions as well as the 
family influence on executive appointments and top positions; and (iii) recommend 
regulatory and other improvements. 
 
Authors carried out semi-structured with 18 participants in charge of corporate governance 
in Maltese listed companies (MLCs) and conclude that Maltese LFBs do not as yet 
acknowledge the significance of their distinctive features and the implications of such 
features on their CG structures. As a result, the application of specific structures related to 
FBs, in particular, the family constitution and the family institutions are as yet not to be 
found.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The first decade of the 21st century was characterized by several major corporate 
failures, in particular, Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat. These raised serious doubts 
on Corporate Governance (CG) applications at the time (Coffee, 2005) since 
evidence indicated that the main driving force behind such failures was significant 
deficiencies in these structures (Dibra, 2016). Following these major collapses, the 
notion of CG regained due importance and various countries initiated specific 
programs with the aim of developing CG principles (Calder, 2008) on both national 
and international levels.  
 
The term ‘governance’ is stemming from the Latin word "gubernare", which means 
‘to steer’ (Dibra, 2016, p.283), implying that CG is more concerned with giving 
direction. Over the years, the term CG has been given several definitions. The UK 
Cadbury Report defines CG as "the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled" (Cadbury, 1992, p.15). This same definition has been adopted by the 
Maltese Working Group on CG upon formulating the local Code of Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance (‘Code’). The Cadbury Report also specifies that whilst 
directors are responsible for the company’s governance, shareholders shall 
contribute to governance by appointing directors and auditors and weighing their 
satisfaction with regards to how the company is being governed (Cadbury, 1992). 
CG is mainly concerned with three main elements, being directors, senior 
management and shareholders, all having particular roles to play.  
 
2. Defining Family Businesses 
 
One of the main challenges encountered by the majority of family firm researchers is 
the absence of an internationally acknowledged definition of the term ‘family 
business’ (FB) (Kraiczy, 2013). Despite this, many researchers believe that the 
classification of FBs should be done on a case-by-case basis (Astrachan, Klein and 
Smyrnios, 2002). Nevertheless, over the years, various family firm researchers have 
attempted to develop an appropriate explanation of the term, taking into account 
different considerations (Kraiczy, 2013). The diverse interpretations of FBs mainly 
originate from the different degrees of family involvement within the firm.  
 
Due to the lack of a widespread interpretation of the term, the definition adopted in a 
particular study could have an impact on the understanding of the results. Therefore, 
family firm researchers shall clearly state what they understand by such a term for 
the purpose of their research. In their imperative study, Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
defined FBs on the basis of family equity holdings and family representation within 
the Board of Directors (‘Board’). On the other hand, the European Commission 
(2009), specifies that listed entities shall meet the definition of family-controlled 
businesses if the founder or family members own more than 25% of the entities’ 
share capital. Notwithstanding the fact that no common definition exists, Hnilica and 
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Machek (2015) argue that there are three essential elements when defining FBs; 
family ownership, family management and family Board membership. 
 
This study focuses on equity-listed Maltese companies on the Malta Stock Exchange 
(MSE). The majority of Maltese listed companies (‘MLCs’) do not disclose 
information on the composition of their management team and therefore, the 
researcher was not able to identify family representation at the management level. 
For this reason, the distinction between listed family businesses (LFBs) and listed 
non-family businesses (LNFBs), has been made on the basis of shareholding and 
Board membership. For the purpose of the current study, both family-controlled 
businesses – having more than 25% of share capital held by the founding family and 
two or more family directors – and family-influenced businesses – having less than 
25% of share capital held by the founding family and two or more family directors – 
were grouped under the term ‘LFBs’.  
 
3. The Need for the Study  
 
The Maltese market is and has always been, dominated by FBs to the extent that 
such entities are vital to the resilience of our economy. The fact that these firms are 
characterized by a mixture of family and business welfares suggests that the CG 
requirements of large FBs, which may also be publicly traded, are different than 
those of non-family businesses (‘NFBs’) (García-Ramos, Díaz-Díaz and García-
Olalla, 2017). Still, the ideologies behind good governance are widely treated as 
generic principles (Filatotchev, Jackson and Nakajima, 2013) with no concern for 
the setting within which such principles are to be adopted.  
 
There tends to be the presupposition that as soon as FBs convert to a public listing, 
they start implementing rational governance mechanisms, contrasting with the "non-
rational behaviour" which is normally associated with the dynamics of running an 
FB (García-Ramos, Díaz-Díaz and García-Olalla, 2017, p.121). As a matter of fact, 
rather than having good CG recommendations which differentiate between LFBs 
and LNFBs, family executives are continuously advised to conduct themselves as 
outside professionals (ibid.) without recommending any practices of how this can be 
achieved.  
 
The main recommendations found in the Code are not mandatory and therefore the 
extent to which these are being observed is still dubious.  Additionally, 
notwithstanding the fact that FBs are key players in the Maltese economy, the Code 
fails to provide specific guidance with respect to Maltese LFBs. In light of this, the 
present study attempts to build an understanding on the current situation of such 
entities’ CG structures to possibly conclude on whether Maltese LFBs are taking the 
initiative to apply appropriate governance measures which meet their strategic 
needs, even though there are no obligatory regulations or recommendations on the 
matter. In this context, this study will attempt to (i) ascertain the characteristics of 
LFBs; (ii) assess the family governance structures (‘FGS’) in such companies 
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including the role of family institutions as well as the family influence on executive 
appointments and top positions; and (iii) recommend regulatory and other 
improvements.  
 
4. Methodology 
 
i. The Research tool 
Semi-structured scheduled interviews were considered to be the most adequate 
research tool for attaining the objectives of this study. One predominant feature of a 
semi-structured interview is that it enables the researcher to develop an interview 
schedule, which sufficiently addresses the research questions while allowing the 
participants to delve deeper by providing their insights on the topics discussed 
(Galletta, 2013). Moreover, semi-structured interviews enable the researcher to 
question the reasoning behind the interviewees’ responses. Since identical questions 
are being asked, data collected will be comparable (McIntosh and Morse, 2015). 
Consequently, semi-structured interviews are presumed to absorb the features of two 
other widely used research tools, namely structured questionnaires and unstructured 
interviews. 
 
The pre-established interview questions have been targeted toward companies 
having their equities listed on the MSE. Although the study focuses on LFBs, 
respondents from all MLCs have been sought, aiming to gather different viewpoints 
on the topic. The interview schedule includes a mixture of closed-ended and open-
ended questions. The closed-ended questions were prepared in the form of a Likert 
scale, and the interviewees have been requested to rate their responses using a scale 
between ‘0’ for strongly disagree to ‘4’ for strongly agree. 
 
ii.  The Sample Population 
The researcher seeks the opinion and perspective of certain professionals actively 
involved in the area of the study. Consequently, a purposive sampling technique has 
been considered to be the most suitable technique, which will enable the researcher 
to address the research problem and meet the research objectives (Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill, 2007). After deliberating on the research area and the research 
questions, it was established that company secretaries of MLCs are the target 
population for the present study. 
 
A list of equity listings was extracted from the MSE website. In order to determine 
which MLCs meets the definition of family-controlled or influenced companies 
adopted by this study, the researcher evaluated published company information. It 
was concluded that 7 out of 22 MLCs fall within the definition of LFBs as adopted 
by this study. In total, 18 interviews with representatives from MLCs have been 
conducted and participated in the interviews. The interviewees represent 20 
companies; 19 companies having their equity listed on the MSE as at 31st March 
2018 and 1 former MLC which was recently taken over by another MLC. Moreover, 
2 interviewees occupy the role of company secretary in multiple MLCs.  
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iii.  The Analysis 
Quantitative data received from the closed-ended statement/question was inputted 
into Ms Excel and the mean score value calculated and analysed visually by looking 
at whether this was closer to the ‘0’ – Strongly agree, ‘1’- agree, ‘2’- neutral, ‘3’- 
disagree or ‘4’- strongly disagree  value scale. However, this data was not seen in 
isolation but together with the interviewees’ comments following their choice of 
value on the Likert scale to each statement/question. Such qualitative responses were 
evaluated by means of summarising the transcripts and interview notes and grouping 
similar responses (Braun et al., 2006).  
 
iv. Limitations 
Despite the efforts exerted, two MLCs’ representatives declined the researcher’s 
invitation for an interview and another two did not respond at all. Moreover, bias in 
the responses of both LFBreps as well as LNFBreps is inevitable. Several LNFB 
reps claimed that they have some level of experience with FBs, and others stated that 
they were never involved with such entities. However, the authors felt that saturation 
had been reached at 18 interviews since they started to get similar answers (Morse, 
1995)  
 
5. Findings and Discussion:  Distinctive Features of LFBs 
 
a) Is the Performance of LFBs Affected by Family Members’ Involvement in 
Business Affairs?  
In its handbook on family governance, the IFC (2011) stated that having family 
members occupying different roles in the entity’s affairs might cause additional 
complexities. Research participants explained that such involvement may 
simultaneously both add value to, as well as intimidate normal business practices.  In 
fact, in line with the views of Miller, Steier and Le Breton-Miller (2016), most 
interviewees highlighted that business success is within the personal interest of 
active family members. This is likely to result in an entity-wide mindset of work 
ethic and enthusiasm, shaping a culture of loyalty and commitment towards the 
enterprise. This approach may be contrasted with attitudes commonly found within 
LNFBs, whereby since they do not have a vested interest in the business, directors 
and other senior recruits may apply a lenient attitude where they are not concerned 
unless their annual earnings will be affected.  
 
Nevertheless, as interviewees repeatedly emphasized, a family member’s personal 
stake in the business does not give him/her a "God-given right" to occupy any role. 
For good governance’s sake, if a family member wishes to occupy a particular 
position within the firm, s/he needs to be made to apply for that position like any 
other non-family member. Then, if such a person is considered to be just as good as 
the best outside person available, there should be no prejudice against such person 
owing to family membership. However, in such a situation, many would still prefer 
to go for an outsider as such person’s decisions are generally considered to be more 
rational.   
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b) What Common Characteristics are Associated with LFBs?  
When starting an FB, the founders are likely to consider the entity as the vehicle 
expected to sustain the present and subsequent generations. This approach generates 
certain attitudes which are quite uncommon in entities not having a family element.   
i. Non-Economic Goals: As suggested by Daspit et al. (2017) and also by 
research participants, FBs are not likely to be solely financially-driven as the 
family in business normally wishes to infuse family values and principles 
within business operations. However, if family agendas cease to make 
business sense, the entity’s prospects may be shattered. Other family-
oriented motives, such as undergoing well-organised growth procedures and 
ensuring business continuity, may be beneficial in establishing an adequate 
business culture. Therefore, measures should be established to promote 
beneficial motives and eliminate detrimental non-financial ones.   
ii. Permanent Posts: Family members occupying senior roles are likely to 
remain in their position for a longer term – this putting them in a better 
position to use their tacit knowledge to adequately plan for the future. This 
is in line with the suggestions put forward by Wallevik (2009) and Athwal 
(2017). However, as rightly noted by several interviewees, having top 
positions occupied indefinitely might easily lead to a culture of resistance to 
change. In most current Maltese LFBs, the Chairman position is occupied by 
the founder or his successor, and the role has been occupied for quite some 
time. Although this is understandable, it is necessary to ensure that such 
persons are surrounded by competent professionals able to provide them 
with meaningful advice and consultations. Furthermore, if Board members 
retain their position for prolonged periods, their influence over management 
might become excessive.  Hence, the periodic injection of new blood in the 
boardroom is more important within an FB scenario.   
iii. The illiquidity of Shares: As explained by Mustakallio (2002), the portion of 
shares retained by the controlling family will determine the extent of the 
family’s influence or control. Consequently, as also pointed out by most 
interviewees, upon listing, the family is likely to be reluctant to release a 
significant portion of total equity if control is to be retained. In fact, transfers 
of Maltese LFBs’ shares are generally related to the portion owned by the 
public and not by the founding family. However, if this attitude persists also 
in instances when additional capital is required but no alternative sources of 
finance are available, this may be harmful to business operations and result 
in growth limitations.    
iv. Long-Term Outlook: Moreover, the family unit tends to focus not only on 
current business success but also on handing over a successful business to 
succeeding generations. As PWC (2013) explained, FBs tend to apply a 
longer-term attitude when compared to their non-family counterparts. This is 
in line with some LFBreps’ responses, who stated that their decision-making 
process would deliberately consider the impact on subsequent generations. 
This might result in conservative investment strategies, which are less risk-
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based, the consequence of which might be the willingness to occupy a 
marginal position within the industry, allowing competition to take over.   
v. Trust: The extent to which family members involved in business operations 
trust one another highly depends on the characteristics and values of the 
family along with the personality and integrity of the principal actors 
involved. Therefore, it is difficult to generalise in this respect. This is in line 
with the arguments put forward by Steier (2001) and most interviewees. The 
implication is that if you have the appropriate family culture generating 
trustworthy personalities, the likelihood would be of deeper bonds 
enhancing trust. However, if trust relations among relatives are interrupted, 
the consequences are likely to be more dangerous and remedying such 
conflicts might be a more sensitive and prolonged affair.  
  
c) What Are the Resulting Advantages and Disadvantages of Operating an LFB?  
The involvement of family members in business activities may be considered both as 
a strength and as a weakness. Quite inconsistent with the views of Miller, Steier and 
Le Breton-Miller (2016), who maintained that family involvement is expected to 
reap positive results, several interviewees emphasized that this mainly varies with 
the level of professionalism and technical viability of the individuals involved. If the 
right family members are appointed, generally they are inclined to be more 
committed and dedicated to the entity.  
 
Consequently, family members’ long-term tenure normally results in an elevated 
sense of stability. While conforming to the responses of LNFBreps, this premise is 
also supported by Athwal (2017) and Lee (2006).  Moreover, internal and external 
stakeholders are likely to develop stronger and more meaningful bonds with FBs, 
particularly if the family has been involved in the business for decades and enjoy a 
reputable market standing. However, as rightly stated by some interviewees, such 
bonds tend to be stronger in earlier generations, being weakened later on by the 
involvement of extended family members. 
 
In any case, the involvement of family members may also have its drawbacks. To 
begin with, although conflicts are a feature inherent to all business operations, 
matters seem to be more sensitive when there are family relations involved. As 
argued by PWC (2012) and some research participants, one such common cause for 
conflict is the issue of succession. Additionally, instances of blind family 
appointments and distinctions between family and non-family employees are 
difficult to do away with. The repercussions of such circumstances on business 
performance will be subject to the position in question as well as to the size of the 
firm. Moreover, leniency towards family candidates may also prevent a fair 
judgment with respect to the persons most fitting for particular roles or promotions. 
Consequently, as Cadbury (2000) insists, this lack of objectivity is likely to 
negatively impact outside professionals employed by the company and the future 
prospects which they perceive.   
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6. The Family Governance Structure 
   
a) Who is appointed on the Board of LFBs?  
When appointing or electing Board members, LFBs are likely to consider a number 
of features which are not commonly considered by LNFBs.  It is indeed "natural" to 
expect members of the founding family to encourage the appointment of family 
directors. This may be partly because family shareholders tend to consider such 
appointments as a means through which they can exert a degree of influence over 
business dealings. Therefore, caution needs to be taken for objectivity in the 
selection process not to be impaired. 
 
Furthermore, Cannella, Jones and Withers (2015) and most LNFBreps agree that the 
unique characteristics associated with FBs render candidates holding previous 
experience in FB corporate affairs to be a better fit. However, this conflicts with the 
view held by LFBreps stating that such a feature is not particularly taken into 
consideration when appointing directors. It may be that specific experience in FBs is 
more valued in practice than LFBreps themselves declare. When appointing Board 
members, family relations and bonds are also often considered but it would be 
imprudent if LFBs appoint family members who are inexperienced, unprofessional 
and with a bad market reputation. However, although most interviewees indicated 
that such entities look for a mix of worthwhile attributes when selecting Board 
members, several LNFBreps held that family relations and bonds are likely to take 
precedence over other more significant features. 
  
b)  How Should LFBs’ Boards be Composed?  
The quest for an appropriate balance between family and non-family directors 
remains an important dilemma which may vary with the characteristics and nature of 
each particular company. Having a suitable proportion of non-family and 
independent directors is likely to assist in safeguarding transparency, accountability 
and confidence in LFBs Boards’ performance. In fact, the involvement of 
independent and non-family directors is likely to result in family Board members 
being more accountable for their actions. Since Boards are expected to effectively 
challenge management, an excess of family involvement at Board and management 
levels will unnecessarily restrict the Board’s ability to exercise its role effectively. In 
fact, in line with the arguments of Goh, Rasli and Khan (2014), most interviewees 
indicated that the effectiveness of such Boards’ monitoring function tends to be 
questioned in such circumstances. Moreover, appointing a majority of independent 
directors who are incapable of properly discharging their duties will not in itself lead 
to enhanced Board performance. In fact, as rightly underlined by an LFBrep, one 
may even be deceived by a majority of independent directors, as this may be used to 
convey a fictional image of professionalism. 
   
c) What Are the Implications of Appointing Family Board Members?  
Board members are expected to comply with the obligations imposed by the 
Companies Act and the Listing Rules. However, directors could end up being 
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influenced by the group that appointed them, especially in an FB setting. This point 
is supported by Ponomareva and Ahlberg (2016) as well as most interviewees. 
Board members appointed by the family may be much more willing to exert a 
degree of preference towards the desires of the controlling family due to reluctance 
to go against the wishes of the majority. This may result in situations whereby non-
family directors will only be willing to intervene if the matter in question directly 
influences their personal intentions or reputation.   
 
Furthermore, family relations in the boardroom may lead to increased tensions 
among family directors from different factions of the family, possibly disturbing 
Board performance. In the event of conflicts, as rightly explained by several 
interviewees, if the cause for such conflict is associated with business operations, the 
Board may be expected to promptly arrive at a solution. In such circumstances, the 
role of independent directors may turn out to be critical, as their view is often 
considered as objective and purely professional. On the other hand, if the cause for 
conflict is associated with family dynamics, the Board is not an adequate venue for 
resolving such issues.  Moreover, the Code holds that the Board should perform 
annual self-evaluations. However, family relations at Board level are likely to 
compromise the effectiveness of such evaluations, as certain issues may deliberately 
remain concealed or overlooked. Therefore, a reasonable balance between family 
and non-family Board members may be suitable in this regard. 
   
d) What Are the Implications of Appointing Family Members in Senior Management 
Positions?    
Cadbury (2000) suggests that the entity grows, family and non-family members shall 
be presented with equal engagement and growth opportunities. However, as indicated 
by most LNFBreps, this is not something which family executives will accept with 
delight. This resistance generally originates from family members’ attitude of 
ownership and entitlement towards the business. However, it may take years after 
listing for family executives to appreciate that, given the public stake, the business 
has ceased to be the "family jewel" and that they need to adjust accordingly – that is, 
to accept their mandate to properly execute business dealings alongside other 
executives. One way to facilitate this could be working towards establishing a culture 
of power and knowledge while the entity is still in its pre-listing phase. When 
engaging individuals to senior management roles, imposing contractual time limits of 
say 3 to 5 years tends to be more easily effected in the case of outsiders rather than in 
the case of family members. For the benefit of the entity itself, if senior positions are 
expected to be perpetual, the individuals appointed to such roles shall be competent 
and remain well informed about changes in the market in order to maintain 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, some interviewees insisted on the importance of 
"fresh blood" after a number of years.  
  
e) What Are the Implications of Having a Family Chairman or CEO?  
Apart from having family members involved in directorships and the management 
team, it is common for the founding family to occupy the post of Chairman, CEO, or 
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in rare cases, even both. Provided that such roles are critical for the CG structure of 
an entity, LFBs should consider the implications that such family relations may have 
on the adequate execution of such roles as well as on the entity’s performance. 
 
First, given the sensitivity associated with terminating a family member’s contract, 
most interviewees indicated that having a family CEO tends to put the Board in an 
uncomfortable position if they are not satisfied with such CEO’s performance. 
Matters will become even more complicated if such CEO is related to several Board 
members. This may occur despite that, in theory, the Board shall be composed of 
professional individuals whose integrity and judgment is not prejudiced by family-
ties. In such circumstances, any delays by the Board with respect to hiring or firing a 
CEO for the sake of respecting the family will turn out to be detrimental to the 
business.  Furthermore, most LNFBreps suggested that a CEO is more likely to exert 
a lenient attitude towards management team members with whom s/he shares a 
blood relationship. 
 
Apart from this, in instances where the CEO is independent and the Chairman is a 
family member, the CEO might be reluctant to report the underperformance of 
family personnel. In such circumstances, the CEO’s role becomes quite vulnerable 
as the CEO will attempt to maintain a healthy relationship with the Chairman and 
the Board. In fact, an LFBrep explained that bias in such circumstances would be 
inevitable as "blood is thicker than water". 
 
To avoid the above-mentioned possibilities, most interviewees suggested that the 
CEO post needs to be independent of the family, especially if the Chairman is a 
family member him/herself. Similarly, Villalonga and Amit (2006) found that value 
will be created by restricting family involvement to only one of such roles. The 
appointment of a CEO shall be all about competence rather than anything else. If a 
particular candidate is resilient, open-minded, future-oriented, willing to voice his 
opinions and reject any form of favouritism, the entity’s performance shall not be 
affected by whether the person concerned is a family member or not. However, such 
ideal behaviour is quite difficult to exert with blood relatives involved. Furthermore, 
there is no guarantee that having a family Chairman and an outside CEO will ensure 
that the CEO does not favour the family. With regards to the Chairman, most 
interviewees agreed with such post being occupied by a family member since the 
role is non-executive. It is, in fact, common for the Chairman’s role to be occupied 
by a key family member, therefore, assuming that such a person has the best interest 
of the entity at heart, it is more likely that the visions set will be in line with those of 
the majority shareholders, though not necessarily with those of the minority 
shareholders. 
 
Additionally, the Code attempts to clearly distinguish between the respective roles 
of the Chairman and CEO and to ensure that there is no duality in these roles. Yet, 
although these roles may not be performed by the same individual, there have been 
instances where blood-related individuals occupied such roles simultaneously. One 
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main implication of such roles being family-related is that one party may effectively 
dominate, if not completely take over, the role of the other party. Such role infusion 
is clearly a stumbling block to good CG.  
 
f) What Are the Implications of Having Board-Management Family Relationships? 
 The extent to which family relationships within the Board and management levels 
affect business activities varies with the company’s structure. In order for the Board 
to effectively discharge its supervisory duties over management, independence 
should be safeguarded either at Board or management level. In fact, in contrast with 
the conclusions of Poutziouris, Savva and Hadjielias (2015) that family relations 
between directors and management enhance entity performance, most LFBreps 
insisted that they attempt to avoid such family relations to minimize directors’ bias 
towards management. Furthermore, in line with the findings of Chen, Gray and 
Nowland (2011), several LFBreps stressed that to safeguard the Board’s ability to 
exercise effective control over management, Board independence shall be especially 
emphasized in business structures where family involvement within management is 
substantial.  
 
Where management team members are blood-related with Board members, trust and 
transparency are perceived to be at stake. This was the view held by most 
participants.  On the same note, Gersick et al. (1997) insisted that such family-ties 
are likely to increase the possibility of informal dealings between such parties, 
disregarding non-family members’ right to be involved. However, several 
interviewees stressed that the entity’s inbuilt culture and values, as well as the type 
of relationship which exists among the family members involved, determine the 
extent to which the notions of trust and transparency are influenced by such family-
ties. If healthy relations within the family exist, information sharing will be 
enhanced by having family members involved throughout the entity’s strata. 
Alternatively, this may also lead to situations wherein family members would refrain 
from sharing information with each other or even worse, conspire to hide 
information from non-family members. It is not just a matter of having the necessary 
policies and procedures in place but also complied with. However, when such family 
relations exist, more value needs to be attached to market perceptions regarding the 
effectiveness of the Board and the professionalism of the management team. 
   
g) Will the Establishment of a Family Constitution and Family Institutions Enhance 
CG?   
LFBs are characterized by certain features, which distinguish them from their non-
family counterparts. The purpose of having non-binding CG recommendations is to 
allow for the implementation of a CG structure adapted to the entity’s specific 
requirements. In the light of this, LFBs need to appreciate that given their culture, 
some additional CG features may need to be adopted to ensure the formation of an 
adequate FGS.   
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As defined by Neubauer and Lank (1998), the family constitution is a useful 
document which serves as a relevant guide to regulate intra-familiar relations and to 
prevent unnecessary conflicts. Therefore, such a document may serve as the tool 
which draws and emphasizes the fine line between family and business matters. 
Most interviewees specified that such document will only be effective if the family 
accepts what the document is intended to achieve.  Nevertheless, having family 
members agreeing and documenting how certain family-related matters are to be 
dealt with will safeguard harmony and professionalism within business activities. In 
fact, in line with the findings of KPMG (2017), all interviewees agreed that the 
development of such a document will be beneficial for LFBs’ operations. 
 
However, despite this, it is evident that Maltese LFBs lack proper awareness 
regarding such benefits as none of the LFBs interviewed have a formally established 
family constitution in place. It is noteworthy that only one of the FB reps was 
knowledgeable about the workings of such a structure. 
 
Furthermore, in order to regulate the family’s involvement in business matters, LFBs 
may consider the establishment of institutions such as the family assembly and 
council. In line with the findings of Brenes, Madrigal, and Requena (2009), most 
interviewees agreed that the formation of such bodies will promote a healthier 
relationship between the family and the business, support prompt intra-familiar 
conflict resolutions and promote unity among the family. Although once again, none 
of the LFBs interviewed have these institutions formally established, few LFBreps 
declared that they have legal structures in place which may serve a similar purpose, 
in the form of holding companies owned by family owners. This supports the 
observation made by Taylor Wessing (2014) that public companies are likely to 
form legal bodies in an attempt to regulate the level of control held by various 
interested parties.  
 
Such arrangements may serve different purposes depending on the structure of the 
LFB concerned. However, whether family presence within the entity’s affairs is 
quite substantial or rather scarce, the main purpose of establishing such governance 
bodies is to provide a platform through which family members are allowed to voice 
their views and arrive at unified visions which will be presented to the Board or the 
AGM. Therefore, such structures may serve as communication media between the 
family and the business and the resulting proposals emanating from such structures 
are not decisive.  
 
With regards to the establishment of a family office, one LFBrep explained that such 
a structure is not adequate for listed companies, as within such governance body 
"confidentiality and secrecy are the order of the day". This contrasts with the views 
held by Forbes (2013), Gray (2011) and most interviewees, suggesting that the use 
of a family office may prevent potential intra-familiar conflicts as a result of the 
management and the distribution of family wealth by entrusting such matters within 
the hands of family members or even non-family consultants. Family offices are 
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probably most applicable for exceptionally wealthy families in business and 
therefore not necessarily relevant to all Maltese LFBs. 
 
7. The Maltese Regulatory Framework 
 
a) Does the Code Fulfil the Needs of All MLCs?  
The CG principles included in the Code are quite generic in nature. However, this 
universality is intentional, aiming to encourage MLCs to interpret and implement 
such recommendations depending on the entity’s structure. Consequently, many 
interviewees argued that given its broad nature, the Code successfully caters for the 
circumstances of all companies having their equities listed on the MSE, irrespective 
of whether they are family-controlled or otherwise. This implies that a number of 
MLCs do not acknowledge that there are any CG implications arising from the 
distinctive features associated with LFBs. On the other hand, several interviewees 
stressed that the Code’s generic nature limits its applicability to the specific needs of 
LFBs. Although the CG principles are capable of serving as a relevant guideline if 
properly adapted to an entity’s structure, whether or not such careful implementation 
is being done in practice is questionable. Consequently, if LFBs fail to determine the 
additional CG measures required to reflect their distinctive business structure, the 
professionalism attached to such entity’s activities and the suitability of several 
business practices are likely to be challenged. 
   
b) How Can the Code be Made More Effective with Regards to LFBs? 
Family Board membership is a common LFB feature which may interrupt effective 
Board performance. However, despite the overall agreement of LNFBreps with 
respect to a recommended proportion of family members sitting on the Board and its 
subcommittees, mainly the Nomination and Remuneration committees, in general, 
LFBreps did not find such recommendation necessary, stating that the Code already 
tackles this issue. In fact, such a Code amendment, if effected, was considered to be 
rather discriminatory and several interviewees re-emphasised that what is more 
important is that Board membership is purely based on competence. However, the 
point might have easily been missed that the objective of such proportions is to 
establish adequate safeguards towards the interests of non-family minority 
shareholders.  The Code also invites Board members to review the performance of 
the Board itself and that of its subcommittees on a yearly basis. However, family 
relations at Board level are likely to raise questions about the effectiveness of such 
evaluations. Consequently, one LFBrep suggested that appointing a team of external 
consultants to assist in these evaluations is likely to portray a message of 
professionalism and good governance. If such consultants are perceived as 
independent, their observations and concerns regarding the Board’s effectiveness 
and the overall governance structure, are likely to be more valued. This is likely to 
reflect positively on the market perceptions towards the entity’s best practice. 
 
Furthermore, the Code recommends the appointment of independent NEDs. When 
assessing directors’ independence, there are considerations which go beyond family 
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relationships. Yet, the latter remains a relevant factor because for a person to be 
considered as truly independent, such individual shall be free from any social and 
financial ties with the family and the business. Garcìa-Ramos and Garcìa-Olalla 
(2011) explain that in certain instances, the founding family may attempt to appoint 
directors who are deceitfully presented as independent in order to retain family 
dominance over the Board.  In such circumstances, the performance of the Board 
and its subcommittees will be affected negatively. To counteract this, the Listing 
Authority may need to assign personnel to be responsible specifically to ensure that 
all such entities have a suitable proportion of truly independent directors and that 
such directors are properly discharging their duties.  
 
Additionally, several interviewees also recommended the absence of family 
involvement in senior management positions. The rationale behind limiting family 
involvement to non-executive positions is to further limit family influence on day-
to-day business operations. Furthermore, in view of propositions raised earlier, 
several interviewees agreed that the Code should recommend a no blood relationship 
between the Chairman and the CEO.  Few LFBreps emphasized the importance of 
having the CEO engaged on a definite contract. Provided that the CEO’s 
appointment is supposedly purely competence-based, the Board should thus be 
provided with the opportunity to evaluate the CEO’s performance and to decide 
whether as to reappoint. This also enhances the CEO’s drive towards continuously 
proving suitability for that post, given his/her consciousness that a suboptimal 
performance may lead to not being reappointed for another term.   
 
Moreover, although the Code refers to the responsibility of the Board, the CEO and 
the Nomination Committee with respect to succession planning for the Board and 
senior management, some interviewees highlighted that this is often disregarded and 
a succession plan is rarely developed. Given the added sensitivity attached to role 
succession in FBs, the Code needs to be more specific and detailed in this regard in 
order to minimise the possibility of conflicts and disruption of business operations 
when a key person steps down. Apart from this, having a pre-determined succession 
plan will enable the successor to be properly trained in preparation for taking on a 
significant role, which is likely to result in a smoother transition both for the 
individual as well as for the entity itself.    
 
It was also noted that although most interviewees had not ever to date considered the 
introduction of family constitution and/or institutions within their company, they 
were not averse to such mechanisms, so probably it is more a question of lack of 
awareness on the potential of such mechanisms. In order to tackle this, an 
interviewee suggested for a standard family constitution template to be drafted and 
attached to the Code together with recommendations on the composition and 
functions of the family assembly, council and office.  
 
Finally, another relevant suggestion was for the need for educational programmes to 
raise collective awareness on the responsibility and accountability changes 
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experienced when an entity decides to list. Given the public interest, the transition to 
listing necessitates adherence to more regulations, accountability and best practice 
market expectations.  
 
Upon listing, the traditional mindset of patriarchs who founded the FB needs to be 
revised and commonly, this is far from an easy task. Of course, education 
programmes could help to engineer the needed change. Therefore, to ensure a 
smooth transition and successful continuance after listing, educational programs 
about what listing entails should be held. This may involve the engagement of 
foreign professionals to deliver sessions explaining the purpose, structure and 
workings of family constitutions and institutions and presenting actual case studies 
portraying the potential benefits gained from such structures. Furthermore, such 
sessions may also present stakeholders with specifically relevant advice related to 
successful response to the new directions in governance. Such sessions may assist in 
safeguarding professionalism throughout business operations and also maintaining 
positive market perceptions.   
 
c) Will Recommendations Specific to LFBs Enhance Such Entities’ CG?  
Despite respondents’ initial opposition to LFB/LNFB Code distinctions, most 
interviewees actually agreed to most recommendations presented to them.  However, 
some interviewees still maintained that the addition of specific LFB 
recommendations would be discriminatory and a discouragement for FBs to list. 
Given the small size of Malta, family relationships are common in any business 
structure, not necessarily FBs. Therefore, several interviewees emphasized that if the 
Code was eventually to be made compulsory, such LFB provisions would, in any 
case, need to remain as optional. They also stressed that such provisions would have 
to be made applicable to any scenario where material family relations exist, whether 
in LFBs or LNFBs. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
The authors conclude that Maltese LFBs do not as yet acknowledge the significance 
of their distinctive features and the implications of such features on their CG 
structures. As a result, the application of specific structures related to FBs, in 
particular, the family constitution and the family institutions are as yet not to be 
found.  Several characteristics associated with FBs were ascertained. A number of 
these – namely non-economic goals, the permanence of family-related positions and 
the illiquidity of shares – were identified as being more specifically related to LFBs 
than other characteristics – namely a longer-term perspective and the varying levels 
of trust related to them. Such characteristics contribute to both the strengths and 
weaknesses of CG in LFBs. However, overall, LFBreps considered the various 
characteristics to be resulting in more disadvantages than advantages in their CG in 
relation to the CG situation in LNFBs.   
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The three main parties forming the bulk of a company’s CG structure were 
examined, these being Board members, executives and family shareholders. The 
study established that, prior to appointing Board members, LFBs consider several 
matters which are disregarded by LNFBs. Features such as family relations and 
bonds, previous experiences in FB directorships and tolerance for family control are 
taken into account as a particular type of Board composition incorporating family 
members is commonly sought. Moreover, it is clear Maltese LFBs attempt to keep 
family involvement in executive positions to a minimum in an effort to maintain 
Board independence.  
 
Family involvement in such positions was, therefore, less preferred and frequent 
than those at Board level. In particular, the appointment of a family CEO was 
perceived as being far less ideal than that of a family non-executive Chairman. This 
study also found that, with regards to family involvement in senior positions, too 
much attention is directed toward the professionalism of the individuals concerned. 
However, the perceptions of other market players on the competencies of such 
individuals – which may not necessarily be positive – are not sufficiently taken into 
account in such appointments. Moreover, this study concludes that family 
shareholders in Maltese LFBs do not as yet consider the possible introduction of 
particular CG measures – such as the family constitution, assembly, council and 
office – that attempt to assist FBs in managing family owners’ involvement in 
business affairs. This is mostly caused by the lack of awareness of the advantages of 
such governance mechanisms.   
 
The authors also established that an LFB/LNFB distinction in the Code would be 
considered as discriminatory particularly by LFBs themselves and could, therefore, 
discourage new FBs from considering listing. Despite this, interviewees agreed that 
most of the Code recommendations presented to them - such as the introduction of 
the family constitution and institutions as referred to above, the avoidance of a 
Chairman/CEO blood relationship and an emphasis on succession planning at both 
Board and executive levels – are steps towards better practices. Yet, if such added 
provisions were to become part of the Code, interviewees insisted that they should 
be applicable to all MLCs wherever relevant.  
 
All the efforts of a founding family may be easily undone by the unchecked 
behaviour of their successors if these fail to delve in senior management or Board 
positions without proper induction. In fact, as Baron Nathan de Rothschild, member 
of a well-known banking family, warned: “It requires a great deal of boldness and a 
great deal of caution to make a great fortune; and when you have got it, it requires 
10 times more wit to keep it” (Cowles, 1973). 
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Appendix:  
 
This appendix contains the interview schedule that was used during the interviews conducted 
to guide the discussion with the interviewees on the desired topics. The number of responses 
for each Likert scale statement/question is presented, distinguishing between the number of 
responses from LFBreps (G1) and LNFBreps (G2). 
 
Section 1: Distinctive Features of Family-Controlled and Influenced Companies 
The questions in this section are about various characteristics of family businesses.  
Characteristics of Listed Family Businesses  
1.1 In family-controlled or influenced businesses, family members may be involved 
as owners, members of staff, managers or directors. In what ways is the entity’s 
performance affected by such an involvement. 
 P.J. Baldacchino, A. Gauci, S. Grima 
  
107  
1.2 Comment on whether such features serve as inherent characteristics of family-
controlled/influenced and how they might affect the performance of such entities: 
 
i. Non-economic goals ii. Permanent 
Posts 
iii. Long-term 
Outlook 
iv. Liquidity of shares v. Trust  
 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Family-Controlled or Influenced Companies  
 
1.4 The following are likely 
to serve as 
disadvantages of 
operating a family-
controlled/influenced 
business. 
Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
i. Family conflicts           
ii. Blind family 
appointments 
          
iii. Distinguishing between 
family and non-family 
employees 
          
Please comment on your rating to statements 1.3 and 1.4, explaining your viewpoint on each 
statement.  
Section 2: The Family Governance Structure  
The questions in this section are about various components of the Family Governance 
System.  
i. Board of Directors 
Appointment of Board Members in Listed Family Businesses  
2.1 Family owners would 
encourage the 
appointment of board 
Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1.3 The following are 
likely to serve as 
advantages of 
operating a family-
controlled/influenced 
business. 
Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
i. Family members 
involved in business 
operations 
          
ii. Stronger relationships 
with internal and 
external stakeholders 
          
iii. Enhanced 
commitment and 
stability 
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nominees who: 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
i. Are family members.           
ii. Previously held family 
business directorships. 
          
iii. Will probably not 
oppose family control. 
          
 
 
2.2 Listed family businesses 
appoint Board members 
on the basis of: 
Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
i. Experience.           
ii. Professionalism.           
iii. Previous 
appointments. 
          
iv. Family relations.           
v. Family bonds.           
 
The composition of the Board of Directors in Listed Family Businesses   
 Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
2.3 A majority of non-family 
directors safeguards 
transparency and 
accountability. 
          
2.4 A higher proportion of 
independent directors 
increases the Board’s 
ability to exercise 
effective control and 
monitor executive 
decision making. 
          
Implications of Having Family Members Sitting on the Board  
 Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
2.5 Directors nominated by 
the controlling family 
tend to be more willing to 
make decisions which 
would please the family 
members who encouraged 
their appointment. 
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Please comment on your rating to statements 2.1 to 2.6, explaining your viewpoint on each 
statement.  
ii. Senior Management  
Appointment of Family Members to Senior Management Positions  
 Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
2.7 Family executives tend 
to be rich in tacit 
knowledge but lack 
professional training and 
previous work 
experience outside the 
entity. 
          
2.8 Family executives tend 
to find it difficult to 
accept that they need to 
share their power with 
non-family executives. 
          
 
 
 
 Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
2.6 Apart from their 
monitoring role, directors 
serving on listed family 
businesses’ Boards are 
expected to act as a 
means to resolve conflict 
amongst family 
executives. 
          
 Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
2.9 When appointing top 
executives, family 
owners will be 
reluctant to engage 
outsiders in senior 
positions as an attempt 
to retain family 
control. 
0 0 3 0 2 2 2 9 0 0 
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2.10 Appointing family 
members in top 
executive roles will 
result in: 
Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
i. Added commitment 
towards the entity’s 
long-term prosperity. 
          
ii. Added continuity 
and stability as they tend 
to retain their position 
for longer periods.  
          
 
Implications of Having a Family CEO 
2.11 Having a family-
related CEO will result 
in: 
Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
i. CEO termination to 
become unlikely even 
when justifiable. 
          
ii. Decisions and actions 
being unduly 
influenced by the 
family. 
          
Please comment on your rating to statements 2.7 to 2.11, explaining your viewpoint on each 
statement.  
The Effects on Business Performance When Appointing a Family Chairman/CEO 
2.12 Will the overall business performance and decision-making be affected if a listed 
family business appoints a: 
i. family CEO; 
ii. family Chairman? 
 
iii. Board-Management Family Relationships 
 
2.13 Family ties between 
directors and 
management may 
result in: 
Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
i. Directors making 
decisions unduly 
favouring 
management. 
          
ii. Strengthened trust and 
information sharing 
amongst such parties. 
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2.14 Family ties between 
directors and 
management may 
jeopardise: 
Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
i. Internal transparency.           
ii. External 
transparency. 
          
 
 
2.15 Family-ties between 
directors and 
management: 
Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
i. Enhance Board 
performance. 
          
ii. Obstruct Board 
performance. 
          
iii. Are irrelevant to 
Board performance. 
          
Please comment on your rating to statements 2.13 to 2.15, explaining your viewpoint on 
each statement.  
Implications of Family Relations in Senior Positions 
2.16 What are your views with regards to family relationships between:  
i. members of the Board and management; 
ii. members of the Board themselves; 
iii. the Chairman and the CEO? 
 
iv. Family constitution and family institutions 
 
 Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongl
y 
Disagre
e 
Disagre
e 
Neutr
al 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G
2 
G
1 
G
2 
G
1 
G
2 
G
1 
G
2 
G1 G2 
2.17 Developing a family 
constitution is beneficial for 
listed family businesses. 
          
 
2.18 Business operations 
will be performed 
more smoothly by 
incorporating a: 
Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
i. Family assembly.           
ii. Family council.           
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iii. Family office.           
Please comment on your rating to statements 2.17 and 2.18, explaining your viewpoint on 
each statement.  
 
Section 3: Maltese regulatory framework  
This section deals with the Maltese regulatory framework regarding corporate 
governance in listed family businesses. 
3.1 Does the Code of Principles of Good Corporate Governance for Listed Entities 
adequately fulfils the needs of Maltese listed family-controlled or influenced 
businesses as it does for their non-family counterparts? 
 
3.2 The Code should 
include recommendations 
with respect  
to the: 
Number of Interviewees= 18 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 G1 G2 
i. The proportion of 
family and non-family 
directors serving on the 
Board. 
          
ii. The proportion of 
family members sitting 
on the nomination 
committee.  
          
iii. The proportion of 
family members sitting 
on the remuneration 
committee. 
          
iv. Family 
relationship between the 
Chairman and the CEO. 
          
v. Periodic rotation 
of family members 
occupying executive 
directorships.  
          
vi. Formal 
establishment of a 
family constitution. 
          
vii. Use of a family 
assembly and family 
council.  
          
viii. Preparation of the 
agenda of Board 
meetings. 
          
 
3.3 What regulatory and/or other improvements would you suggest to enhance the 
corporate governance of listed family-controlled or influenced entities? 
Any other comments? 
